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Liquidity Management and Corporate
Demand for Hedging and Insurance
Abstract: We analyze the demand for hedging and insurance by a firm facing
cash-flow risks. We study how the firm’s liquidity management policy interacts
with two types of risk: a Brownian risk that can be hedged through a financial
derivative, and a Poisson risk that can be insured by an insurance contract.
We find that the patterns of insurance and hedging decisions are pole apart:
cash-poor firms should hedge but not insure, whereas the opposite is true
for cash-rich firms. We also find non monotonic effects of profitability. This
may explain the mixed findings of empirical studies on corporate demand for
hedging and insurance.
Key Words: Liquidity Management, Risk Management, Corporate Hedging.
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1 Introduction
Corporate risk management has been the subject of a large academic literature in the
last thirty years. This literature aims at filling the gap between the irrelevance results
derived from the benchmark of perfect capital markets (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) and
the practical importance of risk management decisions in modern corporations.
Several directions have been explored for explaining how and why firms should hedge
their risks,1 among which: managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984), tax optimization (Smith
and Stulz, 1985), cost of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985), cost of external financ-
ing (Stulz, 1990; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). A few papers have applied these
ideas to model corporate demand for insurance.2
The specific testable implications derived from each of these models are different,
but some of them are robust. In particular, there is now a consensus among financial
economists that profitability and liquidity should be important determinants of firms’
hedging and insurance policies. All of the above theories predict indeed that less liquid
and less profitable firms should manage their risks more actively. However, this is only
partially confirmed by the data. Indeed, the empirical literature (see for example Tufano3
1996 and Geczy et al.4 1997) finds that liquidity is indeed an important determinant of
hedging (more liquid firms hedge less), but there is no clear evidence on the impact of
liquidity on insurance decisions. Also, profitability does not seem to have a clear and
robust impact on hedging and insurance decisions.
The main objective of this paper is to show that when liquidity management and risk
management decisions are endogenized simultaneously, the theoretical impact of prof-
1For a critical assessment of these ideas, see Smith and Stulz (1985).
2See for example Mayers and Smith (1982), (1987) and (1990), or Caillaud et al. (2000).
3Tufano (1996) studies risk management behavior in the US gold mining industry. He finds that man-
agerial compensation (in the form of share ownership or stock options holdings) is a major determinant
of the use of derivatives: when managers own shares, firms hedge more, but when managers own options,
firms hedge less. He also finds that more liquid firms hedge less.
4Geczy et al. (1997) study a sample of 372 US firms, composed of the Fortune 500 largest firms that
have at least one source of foreign exchange exposure. They use a logit model to explore the determinants
of the use of currency derivatives. They find evidence that higher quick ratios, indicating more internally
available funds, are associated with a lower probability of using currency derivative instruments.
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itability is non monotonic: the firms that gain the most from actively managing their
risks are not the less profitable nor the most profitable. Moreover, when insurance deci-
sions are explicitly modeled, we find that the optimal patterns of hedging and insurance
decisions by firms are exactly opposite: cash-poor firms should hedge but not insure,
whereas the opposite is true for cash-rich firms. Thus the relation between liquidity and
optimal risk management decisions of firms may be more complex than initially thought.
This may explain the mixed findings of empirical studies on corporate demand for hedging
and insurance, who typically use linear specifications.
The paper uses a continuous time stationary framework a` la Merton (1974) or Leland
(1998), with the important difference that we focus on liquidity risk rather than solvency
risk.5 Namely, we consider a model similar to Radner and Shepp (1996) and Jeanblanc
and Shiryaev (1995) where a firm operates a profitable technology but is confronted with
unpredictable6 liquidity shocks. Cash management is used to reduce the cost of two
financial frictions that work in opposite directions: on the one hand issuing new securities
is costly and on the other hand, free cash-flows can be wasted by managers. We show
that the optimal liquidity management policy of the firm is to accumulate cash balances
up to some target level x∗ and distribute all further gains as dividends. As we explain
below, x∗ can be viewed as a measure of the cost of financial frictions.
We first construct a simple model that allows to integrate liquidity management and
risk management decisions (Section 2). We then use this model to characterize these
optimal decisions (Section 3). Section 4 provides some robustness checks. Section 5
estimates the gains from hedging and insuring. Section 6 concludes by deriving testable
implications on the impact of profitability and risk on corporate hedging. Mathematical
proofs are in the appendix.
5Similar frameworks have been used to analyze the impact of solvency regulations and regulatory
audits on banks’ portfolio decisions: see e.g. Merton (1978), Bhattacharya et al. (2002) or Dangl and
Lehar (2001).
6Specifically, in our model instantaneous cash flows contain a Brownian component. Equivalently,
cumulated cash flows Xt follow a mixed Poisson-diffusion process. By contrast, in Merton (1978) and
Leland (1998) the profitability of the firm is uncertain but cash flows are predictable. That is, in their
model the cash flow process Xt satisfies dXt = μtdt (no diffusion term) but μt itself follows a diffusion.
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2 Integrating Liquidity Management and Risk Man-
agement
One of our objectives is to contrast the behavior of a firm with respect to two types of
risk:
• risks like currency risk that continuously impact the earnings of the firm and can
be hedged through market instruments like futures contracts,
• risks like industrial catastrophes that have a small probability of occurrence but a
large cost if they occur, and can only be covered through an insurance contract7.
In order to introduce a need for active cash management, we follow the strategy of
De´camps et al. (2008) and introduce two financial frictions: a cost of issuing new securities
(which gives a precautionary motive for cash holdings) and an agency cost a` la Jensen
(1986), implying that cash holdings within the firm have a lower rate of return than the
risk free rate because cash can be diverted by managers at their own advantage to the
detriment of outside shareholders. This gives the second part of the trade-off, i.e. a
reason for limiting these cash holdings. We want to build a model allowing to study the
interactions between liquidity management (i.e. when to issue new securities and when
to distribute dividends) and risk management (when to hedge and when to insure). For
simplicity we rule out other frictions such as taxes (implying that the firm will never issue
debt but only equity) or transaction costs on insurance contracts or hedging instruments.
2.1 The Model
We consider a firm characterized by a cash-flow generating process that we decompose
into two parts:
7In the real world, the situation is more blurred: there are market instruments that cover Poisson
risks and vice versa some insurance contracts can cover Brownian risks. Moreover, most risks have both
a continuous and a jump components. Our distinction is only made for expository purposes.
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• “primary” earnings that result from the core activities of the firm and cannot be
modified8,
• other profits and losses that can be modified by the firm through several dimensions
of its financial policy: dividend payments, issuance of new securities, hedging and
insurance decisions.
The firm’s behavior is entirely determined (for a given set of parameters) by a unique
state variable, the level Xt of cash holdings. This level of cash holdings is controlled by
both the dividend policy Z and the issuance policy I. Therefore, in the absence of hedging
or insurance, the dynamics of Xt is given by:
dXt = [μdt + σdWt] + r0Xtdt +
[
σRdW
R
t − LdPt
]− dZt + dIt − dFt. (1)
The first bracket corresponds to the “primary” earnings of the firm: μ is the expected
profitability per unit of time, σ the volatility of “primary” earnings and Wt a standard
Wiener process which cannot be hedged nor insured. r0 ≥ 0 is the interest rate received on
cash holdings. The second bracket corresponds to the two risks that can be managed: the
Brownian risk σRdW
R
t can be hedged at no cost (W
R
t is also a Wiener process, independent
from Wt), while the Poisson risk can be insured (Pt is a Poisson process with intensity λ)
for a fair premium λL per unit of time. We assume that μ > λL (otherwise the technology
would not be profitable). The last three terms correspond to the financial policy of the
firm: Zt is the (non decreasing) cumulative dividend process, It is the (non decreasing)
cumulative issuance process and Ft is the cumulative cost of external financing: A fixed
cost f is incurred every time new securities9 are issued.10. Therefore, the issuance policy
consists of choosing the dates and the amounts of new securities issued. We represent
the times of issuance by a sequence (τn)n∈N and the amounts issued by another sequence
8For simplicity we assume that the size of the firm is fixed, and do not introduce investment nor
depreciation.
9Since there are no taxes nor moral hazard, it can be shown that the optimal security is always equity.
10We could also introduce proportional issuance costs as in Decamps et al. (2008). This would com-
plicate the analysis without changing the qualitative results.
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(in)n∈N. It is modeled by
It =
∞∑
n=1
in1 {τn≤t}, (2)
while Ft is modeled by
Ft = −f
∞∑
n=1
1 {τn≤t}. (3)
When its cash position is negative, the firm has the choice between issuing new equity
or defaulting, in which case shareholders lose everything. Default time is defined as
follows:
τB = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xt < 0}. (4)
Note that τB can be infinite if the firm decides to issue new equity every time its cash
reserves fall to zero.
All investors are risk neutral and discount the future at rate r. Thus the only financial
frictions come from the twin assumptions that f > 0 (which explains why the firm needs
to hold cash) and r0 < r (which explains why the firm does not retain all earnings).
Given an issuance policy ((τn)n≥1, (in)n≥1), a dividend policy Z, and current cash
reserves x ≥ 0, the value of the firm along the policy can be computed as:
v(x; (τn)n≥1, (in)n≥1, Z) = Ex
[∫ τB
0
e−rt (dZt − dIt)
]
, (5)
The objective is to find the optimal shareholder value function V , defined as
V (x) = sup
(τn)n≥1,(in)n≥1,Z
{v(x; (τn)n≥1, (in)n≥1, Z)}; x ≥ 0. (6)
2.2 The Case of Perfect Financial Markets (f = 0)
In the absence of issuance costs (i.e. when f = 0) the firm would never hold any
cash. As long as there is no accident, the firm would either fully distribute its earn-
ings
[
μdt + σdWt + σRdW
R
t
]
in the form of dividends when these earnings are positive
or issue new equity when they are negative. It would be totally indifferent concern-
ing its hedging policy. Concerning insurance, its behavior would depend on the sign of
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μ − (r + λ)L. When this term is negative (large losses) the firm would not insure at all
and would default whenever an accident occurs. In this case, shareholder value would be
VFB(x) = x +
μ
r + λ
, (7)
since initial cash holdings x would be distributed immediately as a lump sum dividend,
and shareholders would also receive a flow of dividends μdt until the first accident. The
expected present value of this cash flow is μ
r+λ
. When μ − (r + λ)L is positive, μ
r+λ
is
smaller than μ−λL
r
. In this case the firm would not keep any cash either but it would
insure completely (or equivalently issue new equity after each accident) and would never
default, leading to a different form of the shareholder value function:
VFB(x) = x +
μ− λL
r
. (8)
Thus we have established:
Proposition 1 Consider the case where issuing new equity is costless (f = 0). The
optimal policy of the firm is such that:
• the firm never holds any cash,
• the hedging policy is irrelevant,
• when L > μ
r+λ
the firm does not buy insurance and defaults whenever an accident
occurs:
VFB(x) = x +
μ
r + λ
;
• when L < μ
r+λ
the firm is indifferent between insuring completely or issuing new
equity every time an accident occurs. The firm never defaults:
VFB(x) = x +
μ− λL
r
.
Note that when f = 0, the second friction (r0 < r) does not matter since the firm
never holds any cash. By contrast, when f > 0 and r0 = r (first friction only) shareholders
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prefer to hoard cash without limits, in order to minimize the probability of having to issue
new equity in the future. But then, no dividends are ever distributed, which means that
the shareholder value maximization problem does not have a well defined solution.
The interesting case occurs when both f > 0 and r0 < r. For tractability reasons we
assume in the core of the text that r0 = 0. The general case r0 > 0 is examined in Section
4.2.
2.3 A Benchmark: Shareholder Value when Risk Management
is Impossible
In order to be able to measure the gains from hedging and insurance, this section studies
the case where these activities are impossible. The shareholder value function V is defined
by formula (6), where issuance and dividend policies are optimized. Following De´camps
et al. (2008) this section shows that the optimal financial policy of the firm depends on
the magnitude of the issuance cost.
Before going further, we need to specify the mathematical formulation of the control
problem faced by the firm. To do this, we introduce an operator M that models the
impact of the issuance of new shares:
MV (x) = max
i≥0
{V (x + i− f)− i}.
Since the firm is free to issue new equity at any moment (for a fixed cost f) it must
be that, for all x, V (x) ≥ MV (x), with equality for all the levels of x at which it is
optimal to issue new equity. Similarly, since the firm can always distribute an amount z
of dividends, to its shareholders (at no cost) its value function satisfies:
∀x ∀z ≥ 0 V (x) ≥ V (x− z) + z.
Dividing by z and letting z converge to zero, we see that V ′(x) ≥ 1, with equality only
in the region where dividends are paid.
External financing costs force the firm to retain some cash in order to reduce the probabil-
ity of financial distress. This creates endogenous risk aversion for the firm’s shareholders:
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the shareholder value function V is concave11and the marginal value of cash holdings
V ′(x) is decreasing in x. The concavity of the value function implies that the optimal
dividend policy is always characterized by a target cash level x∗ such that all cash is
retained below x∗ and distributed above it. This implies:
V (x) = x− x∗ + V (x∗) for x ≥ x∗.
Moreover it can be proved that the optimal V is of class C2, and thus that:12
V ′(x∗) = 1, V ′′(x∗) = 0. (9)
The dividend policy has strong implications for the operator M . Indeed, whenever there
is a new issue, the optimal amount is always13 i = x∗−x+f so that MV (x) = x+(V (x∗)−
x∗−f). Since the firm cannot continue with a negative cash reserve (when the cash reserve
is negative the only alternative is to issue new shares or liquidate the firm), the value
function V must satisfy V (x) = max(0,MV (x)) for x ≤ 0. It is interesting to note that
V is convex in the financial distress region. In particular, V (0) = max(0, V (x∗)−x∗− f).
Finally, whenever x > 0, the firm’s management always has the option to remain passive
(no dividend, no issuance), in which case, the value function evolves like a discounted
martingale, so that:
rV (x) = μV ′(x) +
(
σ2 + σ2R
2
)
V ′′(x)− λ [V (x)− V (x− L)] .
Whenever remaining passive is not optimal it must be that:
rV (x) ≥ μV ′(x) +
(
σ2 + σ2R
2
)
V ′′(x)− λ [V (x)− V (x− L)] .
Therefore it is useful to introduce the second order differential operator with delay:
AU(x) = μU ′(x) +
(
σ2 + σ2R
2
)
U
′′
(x)− (r + λ)U(x) + λU(x− L).
In all the paper, the characterization of the optimal policy of the firm will be obtained in
three steps:
11Concavity of the value function is a general property of this class of problems. see Clark and Kiessler
(2002) for a general proof when the cash reserve process is continuous. Their proof does not extend to
our framework, due to Poisson jumps.
12The second condition is often called super-contact (see Dumas (1991)).
13This is because there is no proportional cost of issuance. Introducing such a cost does not alter the
qualitative properties of V . See De´camps et al. (2009) for details.
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• showing that the value function satisfies some differential equation with endogenous
boundary conditions (a free boundary problem),
• finding a feasible strategy that generates a value function that solves this problem,
• proving that no feasible strategy can strictly improve on this value function (verifi-
cation theorem).
We are now in a position to characterize the value function when risk management is
impossible.
We first consider the case where L is so large (the precise condition will be given
below) that the firm always defaults after an accident: V (x − L) ≡ 0 for all x ≤ x∗. In
this case the operator A takes a simpler expression:
AU(x) =
(
σ2 + σ2R
2
)
U ′′(x) + μU ′(x)− (r + λ)U(x).
Moreover, if the issuance cost is so large (here also the precise condition will be given
below) that shareholders prefer to default whenever the firm runs out of cash (V (x) = 0
for every x ≤ 0), the previous discussion suggests that the optimal shareholder value
function V satisfies:
AV (x) = 0 on some interval [0, x∗]
with the boundary conditions
∀x ≤ 0, V (x) = 0, V ′(x∗) = 1 and V ′′(x∗) = 0.
It turns out that Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995), have established that there is a
unique pair (V0, x
∗
0) solution to this boundary problem:{ (
σ2+σ2R
2
)
V
′′
0 + μV
′
0 − (r + λ)V0 = 0 for 0 < x ≤ x∗0
V0(0) = 0 , V
′
0 (x
∗
0) = 1 and V
′′
0 (x
∗
0) = 0
The next proposition states that the value function V coincides indeed with V0 for large
losses L and large issuance cost f . More precisely, we have:
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Proposition 2 In the case of large potential losses and large issuance cost (specifically,
when L ≥ x∗0 and f ≥ μr+λ − x∗0) we have V = V0. Consequently, optimal liquidity
management is such that:
• The firm retains all cash up to some threshold x∗0 and distributes all cash above x∗0.
• The firm never issues new equity and defaults whenever x < 0.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
A closed form solution is available by introducing θ1 < 0 < θ2, the roots of the quadratic
equation
r + λ = μθ +
1
2
(σ2 + σ2R)θ
2.
The shareholder value function is given by:
V0(x) =
eθ2x − eθ1x
θ2eθ2x
∗
0 − θ1eθ1x∗0 for x ≤ x
∗
0 (10)
= x− x∗0 +
μ
r + λ
for x > x∗0. (11)
where the target cash level for dividend distribution is:
x∗0 =
1
θ2 − θ1 ln
θ21
θ22
. (12)
This case is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Shareholder value V0(x)
compared with the first best value VFB(x).
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In our simple set-up, the target cash level x∗0 is a good measure of the cost of financial
frictions: indeed for x large (specifically for x ≥ x∗0, i.e. outside the financial distress
region) the difference between VFB(x) and V0(x) is precisely equal to x
∗
0. Thus the cost
of financial frictions is measured exactly by the amount of cash reserves that have to be
kept idle by the firm (remember our assumption that cash reserves are not remunerated).
In the more general case where r0 > 0 (studied in Section 4.1) the target cash level is
x∗ > x∗0, and the cost of financial frictions is measured by
(
1− r0
r
)
x∗, the present value
of foregone interest (r − r0)x∗ on the target cash reserve.
The same reasoning can be employed in the case where L is large but f is small.
Indeed, assume for a while that there is a unique pair (V1, x
∗
1(f)) that solves the following
free boundary problem:(
σ2 + σ2R
2
)
V
′′
1 + μV
′
1 − (r + λ)V1 = 0 for x ≤ x∗1 (13a)
V
′
1 (x
∗
1) = 1 and V
′′
1 (x
∗
1) = 0 (13b)
V1(x) = max(0, x + V1(x
∗
1)− x∗1 − f) for x ≤ 0 (13c)
The next proposition states that the value function V coincides with V1 for large losses
L and small issuance cost f . More precisely, we have:
Proposition 3 In the case of large potential losses and small issuance costs (specifically
when L ≥ x∗0 and f < μr+λ−x∗0), we have V = V1. Consequently, optimal cash management
is characterized by:
• The firm retains all cash up to some threshold x∗1(f) (which is smaller than x∗0) and
distributes all cash above x∗1(f).
• Whenever the firm runs out of cash (x = 0), it issues new equity for an amount
x∗1(f) + f .
• The firm defaults if and only if there is an accident.
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
It is easy to check that x∗1 is an increasing function of f such that x
∗
1(0) = 0 and
x∗1(f) = x
∗
0 for f ≥ μr+λ . Moreover, V1(x) converges to VFB(x) = x + μr+λ when f
converges to zero. Here again, x∗1(f) is a good measure of the cost of financial frictions.
A comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 shows the impact of the issuance cost on the div-
idend policy and the default probability of the firm when risk management is impossible.
When the issuance cost is high (Proposition 2) the firm has to reach a high level of cash
x∗0 before distributing dividends. Moreover the probability of default is high since this
default can be provoked either by an accident or by a sufficiently long stretch of negative
cash flows that exhausts the firm’s cash reserves (x = 0). By contrast, when the issuance
cost f is smaller (Proposition 3) the target level of cash x∗1(f) is lower (x
∗
1(f) < x
∗
0) and
default can only the provoked by an accident, since the firm always issues new equity
when it runs out of cash. As a result, the firm’s risk aversion is reduced, dividends are
distributed more often and the probability of default is lower.
In order to study the impact of hedging and insurance on shareholder value, we now
consider the case where risk management is possible.
3 Optimal Risk Management
We now assume that the firm has access to perfect risk management instruments: it can
hedge the Brownian risk at no cost and insure potential accidents at actuarial premiums.
The dynamics of the cash reserves is now given by
dXut = [(μ + r0Xt − λLit)dt + σdWt]+
[
(1− ht)σRdWRt − (1− it)LdPt
]−dZt+dIt−dFt,
(14)
where the control variables of the firm are represented by an adapted process ut =
(It, Zt, ht, it) with It is the cumulative issuance process defined as in condition (2), Ft
is the cumulative issuance cost process defined as (3),and Zt is the cumulative dividend
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process. Moreover ht ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of the Brownian risk that is hedged
and it ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of the Poisson loss that is insured. The optimal shareholder
value function is found by maximizing the expected discounted value of dividends up
to default time τB, the first time the controlled cash flow process X
u
t falls below zero.
Formally
V (x) = max
I,Z,h,i
Ex
[∫ τB
0
e−rt (dZt − dIt)
]
. (15)
3.1 Some Properties of the Solution
As in the benchmark case, the optimal choices of I and Z are characterized respectively
by the operator M defined as:
MV (x) = max
i≥0
{V (x + i− f)− i}
and by the first derivative of V . Again, costly external financing induces the concavity
of V and thus the optimal dividend policy will be again characterized by a target cash
level x∗ such that all cash is retained below x∗ and distributed above it. Because the
marginal value of cash for shareholders is non-increasing, this target cash level is simply
x∗ = inf{x, V ′(x) = 1}. Moreover, optimality implies that V is of class C2, and thus that:
V ′(x∗) = 1, V ′′(x∗) = 0. (16)
As in the benchmark case, it is easily seen that
∀x ≥ 0 ∀i ≥ 0 V (x) ≥ V (x + i)− i− f. (17)
Since V is concave and V ′(x∗) = 1 we have
∀x < x∗ : max
i≥0
{V (x + i)− i− f} = V (x∗)− x∗ − f + x.
Therefore (17) is equivalent to
∀x ≥ 0 V (x)− x ≥ V (x∗)− x∗ − f
Since V ′(x) ≥ 1, we have that
min
x≥0
[V (x)− x] = V (0),
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and therefore V (0) ≥ V (x∗)−x∗−f , with equality if and only if the firm issues new equity
when it runs out of cash. Alternatively, if it never issues new equity: it is liquidated when
x ≤ 0 and then V (0) = 0. As a consequence, V (x) = max(0, x + V (x∗) − x∗ − f) for
x ≤ 0. Therefore, V is locally convex in this region.
In our model, when a firm is in financial distress with a low level of cash, it may raise new
funds. However, we will show that it is never optimal to issue new equity when the cash
reserves are strictly positive. The intuition is as follows. Because of the fixed issuance
cost f , it is always better to defer external financing as long as the firm’s cash reserve is
zero.
• Optimal risk management policy
On the interval (0, x∗), there is no equity issuance and no dividend distribution (dIt =
dZt = 0). Therefore the cash reserve dynamics is given by:
dXt = (μ− λLit)dt + σdWt + (1− ht)σRdWRt − L(1− it)dPt.
Thus, the optimal value function V satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation on
(0, x∗):
rV (x) = max
i,h
(μ− λLi)V ′(x) + 1
2
(
σ2 + (1− h)2σ2R
)
V ′′(x)− λ [V (x)− V (x− (1− i)L)] .
(18)
The concavity of V on (0, x∗) gives rise to a demand for hedging. Since hedging is
costless, it is even optimal to hedge fully:
∀x ∈ (0, x∗) h∗(x) ≡ 1.
The optimal choice of insurance is more subtle.Even if V is concave on (0, x∗) full
insurance is not optimal when an accident sends the firm in the region x < 0 where
the value function V is convex. This creates an incentive to gamble by not purchasing
insurance contracts, even if they are fairly priced.
The marginal gain from partial insurance is measured by λV (x− (1− i)L) while the
marginal cost is iλLV ′(x). Thus the optimal insurance decision i∗ satisfies the condition
λV (x− (1− i∗)L)− i∗λLV ′(x) = max
i
[λV (x− (1− i)L)− iλLV ′(x)] .
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In the region where the function between brackets is concave in i, its maximum is obtained
for i = 1. In the region where it is convex, its maximum is either 0 or 1. Thus we can
assume without loss of generality that i∗ = 1 or i∗ = 0. In order to measure the gain from
insurance, we define the operator D(i) as
D(i)U(x) =
σ2
2
U
′′
(x) + (μ− λLi)U ′(x)− (r + λ)U(x) + λU(x− (1− i)L).
Note that i∗(x) = 0 if and only if D(0)V (x) ≥ D(1)V (x), otherwise i∗(x) = 1.
3.2 Optimal Risk Management when Issuing Costs are High
When issuing costs are high, we establish below that the optimal insurance decision is
given by:
i∗(x) = 0 if 0 ≤ x < x¯0 (19)
= 1 if x¯0 ≤ x ≤ x¯1, (20)
where x¯0 and x¯1 are respectively the insurance and the dividend thresholds. In other
words, buying insurance is optimal when the firm has enough cash (x ∈ [x¯0, x¯1]). The
intuition is given by the shape of the value function: convex for x negative, concave
anywhere else. Since hedging eliminates small risks in the concavity region, it is always
optimal to hedge fully (at least when hedging is costless). By contrast, insurance is
intended to cover large risks, that may make Xt jump below 0, in the convexity region.
This is why insurance is not optimal when the firm is cash-poor.
As explained above, the shareholder value function V can be obtained in three steps: first
finding a C2 solution (V¯ , x¯0, x¯1) to the following free boundary problem (see Lemma 2 in
the Appendix): ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
D(0)V¯ (x) = 0 0 < x < x¯0
D(1)V¯ (x) = 0 x¯0 < x < x¯1
V¯ (x) = 0, x ≤ 0
V¯ ′(x¯1) = 1, V¯ ′′(x¯1) = 0.
(21)
Secondly, we have to check that the smooth solution V¯ of the free boundary problem (21)
is attainable and finally that it satisfies the appropriate verification theorem (Theorem 2
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in the appendix).
The next proposition characterizes the value function and the optimal insurance policy
when the loss is not too large.
Proposition 4 Let (V¯ , x¯0, x¯1) be the unique solution of the free boundary problem (21)and
assume that f ≥ μ−λL
r
− x¯1 and L ≤ μr+λ .
The optimal value function V coincides with V¯ . It is characterized by three regimes:
• 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯0 (no insurance regime):
• x¯0 ≤ x ≤ x¯1 (insurance regime):
• x ≥ x¯1 (dividend regime):
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Proposition 4 shows that insurance is bought when the firm is cash-rich (x > x¯0) and
losses are not too high (L ≤ μ
r+λ
). The properties of the value function corresponding to
optimal policy when L ≤ μ
r+λ
are summarized in the following figure:
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Figure 2: The gains from insurance: The value V¯ (x)
of the firm that insures optimally compared with
the value V0(x) of the firm that does not insure, and
the first best value VFB(x).
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The gains from insurance can be measured by the difference between the cost of
financial frictions without and with insurance. The same is true for hedging.
Note that the no-insurance regime would remain even if the firm had unlimited liability.
This result seems counterintuitive since the convex kink in the firm’s value function in
zero is usually associated with the limited liability option. However, it is interesting to
note that the convex kink remains when the firm has unlimited liability. Suppose indeed
shareholders are forced to inject capital every time x becomes negative. In that case, V
is linear with slope one on ]−∞, 0] since we have
V (x) = x + V (x¯1)− x¯1 − f.
With unlimited liability, the marginal value of cash is still greater than one in a right
neighborhood of zero due to the cost of external funding. As a consequence, there is still
a convex kink at zero which implies that insurance is not profitable for the firm when x is
close to zero. Formally, the expected gain from full insurance is λ(V (0)− V (−L)) = λL
while the expected cost is λLV ′(0+) which is higher.
For completeness, let us examine the case of large losses (L > μ
r+λ
). We show that
in that case, the firm should not insure at all (i.e., i∗ ≡ 0). The optimal value function
when issuance costs are high has the same form as in the benchmark case. In particular
the optimal dividend policy is to pay out any excess cash above a threshold x˜0 which can
be computed explicitly (see Equation (A.10) in the Appendix). As a consequence it is
not optimal for shareholders to insure large risks when external financing is costly, even
if insurance is fairly priced.
Indeed,the next proposition characterizes the value function V for large potential losses
L and large issuance cost f . More precisely, we have:
Proposition 5 When L ≥ μ
r+λ
and f ≥ μ
r+λ
− x˜0, the optimal strategy is never to insure
(i∗ ≡ 0) and the value function is given by Equation (A.9). Consequently:
• The firm retains all cash up the threshold x˜0 and distributes all cash above x˜0.
• The firm never issues new equity.
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• The firm does not buy any insurance.
• The firm defaults if either there is an accident or it runs out of cash.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Small Issuance Cost
When the issuance cost is small, the solution is qualitatively similar but more complex to
characterize. Nevertheless, when losses are large the characterization of the shareholder
value function follows from Proposition 5. The optimal pattern of insurance is still that
cash poor firms find do not insure because an accident brings them in the region where
the value function is convex. When losses are large, the shareholders are effectively
poorer because they face a higher refinancing risk and thus prefer to pay themselves some
dividend rather than buying insurance. We have,
Proposition 6 Assume that L ≥ μ
r+λ
and f < μ
r+λ
− x˜0. Then, the value function is
given by Equation (A.11) in the Appendix. Consequently,
• The firm retains all cash up to some threshold x˜1 and distributes all cash above x˜1.
• Whenever the firm runs out of cash (x = 0) it issues new equity for an amount
x˜1 + f .
• The firm does not buy any insurance.
• The firm defaults if and only if there is an accident.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
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4.2 Remuneration of Cash Holdings
In this section, we assume that cash reserves are remunerated, that is r0 > 0. Our focus
is on the impact on risk management policies when the issuance cost f is large. We
prove that the results of Proposition 4 are robust. More precisely, the optimal policy
is characterized by complete hedging h∗(x) ≡ 1 and a bang-bang insurance strategy
depending on the level of cash reserves, similar to that of Proposition 4.
Proposition 7 The optimal value function V is characterized by three regimes:
• 0 ≤ x ≤ x0 (no insurance regime):
• x0 ≤ x ≤ x1 (insurance regime):
• x ≥ x1 (dividend regime):
where thresholds x0, x1 are characterized by Problem (A.12) in the Appendix.
4.3 Costly Hedging
We assume in this section that πh, the cost of hedging is positive, but not too large, and
by contrast that the cost of issuing new equity is large. In this case, the dynamics of cash
reserves is given by
dXt = (μ + r0Xt − σ
2
R
2
πhht − λLit)dt + (1− ht)σRdWRt − L(1− it)dPt − dZt.
As in the previous section, we can associate to this dynamics of cash reserves the linear
operator given by
A(h, i)U(x) =
1
2
(σ2+(1−h)2σ2R)f ′′(x)+(μ+r0x−
σ2R
2
πhh−λLi)f ′(x)−rf−λ(f(x)−f(x−L))
that characterizes the optimality of hedging/insurance decisions.
Proposition 8 If πh <
μσ2R
σ2+σ2R
then there exists a concave twice differentiable solution
(Vˆ , xˆ0, xˆ1) of the free boundary problem⎧⎨
⎩
A(1, 0)Vˆ (x) = 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ xˆ0
A(0, 0)Vˆ (x) = 0 for xˆ0 ≤ x ≤ xˆ1
Vˆ (0) = 0, Vˆ ′(x1) = 1, Vˆ ′′(xˆ1) = 0.
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Proof: See the appendix. 
This allows to characterize the shareholder value function when hedging costs are positive
but not too large.
Proposition 9 If πh <
μσ2R
σ2+σ2R
and L ≥ μ+r0xˆ1
r+λ
(where xˆ1 is given by Proposition 8) the
shareholder value function coincides with Vˆ . Therefore the optimal solution is such that
the firm only hedges when cash reserves are low:
h(x) = 1Ix<xˆ0 .
Proof: See the Appendix. 
It is interesting to notice the completely opposed impacts of cash holdings on insurance
and hedging. Proposition 9 establishes that cash rich firms should not hedge when hedging
is costly (πh > 0). By contrast, Proposition 4 shows that cash poor firms should not insure
(of course from the perspective of shareholders, not that of society as a whole).
5 Estimating the Gains from Risk Management
In our model, risk management allows to reduce the cost of financial frictions. The cost
of these frictions can be proxied by the target level of cash that must be attained before
distributing dividends. Consider for example the gains from hedging, in a situation where
insurance is not available. When hedging is costless, the firm will always hedge fully.
This comes from the concavity of the shareholder value function in the region x > 0 .
Then if issuing costs are large, the gains from hedging can be immediately assessed from
Proposition 2, by looking at how much x∗0 is reduced when volatility is reduced from
σ2 + σ2R to σ
2.
Let us recall the formula (12) giving x∗0:
x∗0 =
1
θ2 − θ1 ln
θ21
θ22
22
where θ1 < 0 < θ2 are the roots of the quadratic equation
r + λ = μθ +
1
2
(σ2 + σ2R)θ
2.
When hedging is costless (and insurance is impossible or too costly) the target cash level
is given by the same formulas, the only difference being that σ2 + σ2R is replaced by σ
2.
It is therefore legitimate to define a function x∗(μ, σ2) by the two conditions above. The
next proposition shows how x∗0 varies with μ and σ
2.
Proposition 10 : The cost of financial frictions x∗0 is a single peaked function of μ, and
an increasing function of σ2.
The following figures represent the cost of financial frictions x∗0 as a function of μ and
σ2. Note that x∗ is bounded above by μ
r
.
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Figure 3: The cost of financial frictions
as a function of μ and σ2.
Maybe the most striking of these properties is the non-monotonicity of x∗0 with respect
to μ, which measures the net profitability of the firm. Highly profitable firms are not
really affected by financial frictions because their probability of financial distress is small.
Conversely, barely profitable firms have little to lose from failure. It is the intermediate
firms that are hurt the most by the risk of default.
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6 Conclusion: Who Should Hedge?
This paper has derived the optimal hedging and insurance policies of a firm that faces
cash flow risks. We have found that these policies are more complex than expected. In
particular they exhibit non linearities and even non monotonic behavior with respect to
variables of interest, such as liquidity and profitability. Further empirical work on this
topic should therefore adopt specifications that account for these non linearities.
We can also derive from our model several testable implications about which firms are
more likely to hedge,14 in the hope to shed light on the mixed findings of the empirical
literature. We found in Proposition 9 that, provided a firm has decided to use hedging
instruments optimally, it will tend to buy hedging (h = 1) when it is cash-poor (x ≤ xˆ0)
and not hedge (h = 0) when it is cash-rich (x > xˆ0). Consider now the prior decision to
create, within the firm, a risk management unit and to hire the personnel able to manage
the hedging position of the firm according to the instructions given by top management.
This decision is optimal if the gains from hedging exceed the cost of creating this risk
management unit.
An empirical economist who has collected panel data on the balance sheets of a given
population of firms could estimate the parameters of our model such as expected prof-
itability μ, and volatility of earnings σ2. Our model predicts that the probability that
a firm creates a risk management unit (or participates in the derivatives market) is an
increasing function of the gain from hedging, measured by the reduction in the costs of
financial frictions obtained by hedging. When insurance is not available we saw that this
gain could be measured by:
G0 = x
∗(μ, σ2 + σ2R)− x∗(μ, σ2). (22)
We already saw that x∗ was an increasing, concave, function of σ2. Thus we deduce
immediately from formulas (12) and (22) that:
∂G0
∂σ2R
> 0 and
∂G0
∂σ2
< 0.
14For simplicity, we focus on the hedging decision, since the formulas for the gains from insurance are
more complex.
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This means that the gain from hedging increases with the volatility σ2R of the hedgeable
risk and decreases with the volatility σ2 of the “operating” risk. More interestingly, the
impact of μ is non monotonic, as illustrated by Figure 4:
μ

G0

Figure 4: The gain from hedging as a function of profitability μ.
Thus profitability has a non monotonic (and highly non linear) impact on the gains
from hedging. This may explain why empirical studies that use linear specifications have
failed to derive any significant impact of profitability on the likelihood that a firm decides
to hedge.
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Appendix A
We first recall the following result in order to apply the verification procedure.
Theorem 1 Assume that a function U satisfies the following quasi-variational inequalities on
(0,∞)
AU(x) ≤ 0
U(x) ≥ MU(x)
U ′(x) ≥ 1
and
U(x) ≥ max(0,MU(x)) for x ≤ 0.
then U ≥ V .
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof is an immediate adaptation of Oksendal and Sulem (2005),
Theorem 5.2 part a) page 75.
Proof of Proposition 2: Using Theorem 1, it is enough to check that for every x ≥ 0,
AV0(x) ≤ 0,
and
V0(x) ≥ MV0(x) = x + μ
r + λ
− x∗0 − f.
This will establish that V0 ≥ V . Because V0(x) − x ≥ 0 for every x ≥ 0 and μr+λ − x∗0 − f ≤ 0
by assumption, it is thus straightforward that V0 ≥ MV0.
Since x∗0 ≤ L and V0(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0, we have AV0(x) = 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ x∗0. Now, for x ≥ x∗0, we
have
AV0(x) = −(r + λ)(x− x∗0) + λV0(x− L).
This is clearly negative when x∗0 ≤ x < L (this is because V0(x− L) is then equal to 0).
But, for any x ≥ L, one has V0(x− L) ≤ x− L− x∗0 + μr+λ . Thus,
AV0(x) ≤ (r + λ)(x− x∗0) + λ
(
x− L− x∗0 +
μ
r + λ
)
= −r(x− x∗0) + λ(
μ
r + λ
− L) < 0.
This ends the proof that V0 ≥ V . Finally, the value function V0 is attainable (since it corre-
sponds to the admissible policy: pay dividends whenever cash reserves exceed x∗0, the converse
inequality (V ≥ V0) comes directly from the definition of the value function V .
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, we now establish Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3: We first prove that AV1(x) = 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ x∗1. To see this, note
first that V1(x− L) = 0 for every 0 ≤ x ≤ x∗1. Indeed, since V1 is concave, one has
V1(0) ≤ V1(x∗1)− x∗1V ′1(x∗1).
Since V1(0) ≥ 0 and V ′1(x∗1) = 1, this implies:
x∗1 ≤ V1(x∗1) =
μ
r + λ
≤ L.
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Thus, x− L ≤ 0 for every 0 ≤ x ≤ x∗1 and
x− L ≤ x∗1 −
μ
r + λ
= −f − V1(0).
This implies
x− L < −V1(0).
Therefore, V1(x−L) = max(0, x−L+V1(0)) = 0 for every 0 ≤ x ≤ x∗1, which implies AV1(x) = 0
for 0 ≤ x ≤ x∗1. Now, for x ≥ x∗1, we have
AV1(x) = −(r + λ)(x− x∗0) + λV1(x− L).
But, for every x ≥ 0, one has V0(x) ≤ x− x∗1 + μr+λ . Thus,
AV1(x) ≤ −r(x− x∗1) + λ(
μ
r + λ
− L) < 0.
The fact that V1(x) ≥ MV1(x) = x + V1(0) for every x ≥ 0 results directly from the fact that
V1 is concave on (0,∞) and V ′1 ≥ 1. This establishes that V1 ≥ V .
Finally the value function V1 corresponds to an admissible policy. The reverse inequality
(V ≥ V1) comes from the definition of the value function V . It remains to prove that the free
boundary problem (13a)-(13b)-(13c) admits a unique solution. For a fixed x∗1, there is a unique
solution V1 of (13a) that satisfies (13b). It is given by:
V1(x) =
θ22e
θ1(x−x∗1) − θ21eθ2(x−x
∗
1)
θ1θ2(θ2 − θ1) , x < x
∗
1, (A.1)
V1(x) = x− x∗1 +
μ
r + λ
, x > x∗1. (A.2)
To satisfy (13c), the target cash level x∗1(f) must be such that:
V1(0) = V1(x∗1)− x∗1 − f ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to two conditions:
x∗1 +
θ22e
−θ1x∗1 − θ21e−θ2x
∗
1
θ1θ2(θ2 − θ1) =
μ
r + λ
− f, (A.3)
and
μ
r + λ
− x∗1 − f ≥ 0. (A.4)
Therefore, the existence of a unique pair (V1, x∗1) solution of (8) is guaranteed by
Lemma 1 There is a unique solution x∗1(f) to Equation (A.3). Moreover if f ≤ μr+λ − x∗0, it
satisfies condition (A.4).
Proof of Lemma 1: Define an auxiliary function:
ϕ(x) = x +
θ22e
−θ1x − θ21e−θ2x
θ1θ2(θ2 − θ1) + f −
μ
r + λ
.
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It is straightforward to see that ϕ is a decreasing15 function with ϕ(0) = f > 0 and ϕ(+∞) =
−∞. Therefore there is an unique x∗1 such that ϕ(x∗1) = 0.
Moreover (12) implies that ϕ(x∗0) = x∗0 + f − μr+λ which is negative.
Thus x∗1 < x∗0 and x∗1 + f − μr+λ ≤ 0.
The proofs of the optimality of insurance policies rely on the following verification theorem.
Theorem 2 Consider any function U that satisfies the following quasi-variational inequalities
on (0,∞)
max
i∈{0,1}
D(i)U(x) ≤ 0,
U(x) ≥ MU(x),
U ′(x) ≥ 1,
and
U(x) ≥ max(0,MU(0)) for x ≤ 0.
then U ≥ V .
Proof of Theorem 2: It is an easy adaptation of Øksendal and Sulem (2005) Theorem 6.2
part a) page 83.
Proof of Proposition 4:
At this stage, we need to introduce some notation. By analogy with Section 2, let us denote
by γ1 < 0 < γ2 the roots of the characteristic equation corresponding to i = 1 (insurance):
(μ− λL)γ + 1
2
σ2γ2 = r, (A.5)
and by θ¯1 < 0 < θ¯2 the roots of the characteristic equation corresponding to i = 0 (no insur-
ance):16
μθ +
1
2
σ2θ2 = r + λ. (A.6)
Next proposition shows that there is a solution (V¯ , x¯0, x¯1) to (21) such that x¯0 ≤ L.
Lemma 2 Assume L ≤ μr+λ . There is a unique C2 solution (V¯ , x¯0, x¯1) to (21). V¯ is concave
and is given in closed form
V¯ (x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
A¯(eθ¯2x − eθ¯1x) for x ≤ x¯0
B¯eγ1x + C¯eγ2x for x¯0 ≤ x ≤ x¯1
x + μ−λLr − x¯1 for x ≥ x¯1,
where A¯, B¯, C¯ are explicit functions of the parameters. The thresholds x¯0 and x¯1 are given by:
x¯0 =
1
θ¯2 − θ¯1
ln
(
1− Lθ¯1
1− Lθ¯2
)
. (A.7)
x¯1 = x¯0 +
1
γ2 − γ1 ln
(
γ21(1− Lγ2)
γ22(1− Lγ1)
)
. (A.8)
15To see this, note that ϕ′ is decreasing (since ϕ′′(x) = θ2θ1θ2−θ1 (e
−θ1x − e−θ2x) < 0) and ϕ′(0) = 0.
16This assumes implicitly that x¯0 ≤ L, so that V (x− L) = 0 in the no-insurance region. This will be
checked in Proposition 2.
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Proof: The resolution of the free boundary problem (21) yielding to Equations (A.7) and
(A.8) is straightforward. Note that formula (A.8) shows that:
x¯1 > x¯0 ⇔ γ21(1− Lγ2) > γ22(1− γ2).
Since γ1 < 0 < γ2 this is equivalent to
L <
γ1 + γ2
γ1γ2
=
μ− λL
r
,
which is guaranteed by our assumption μ > (r+λ)L. This assumption also implies that θ¯2 < 1L
and γ2 < 1L , so that formulas (A.7) and (A.8) are well defined. We only check the first condition,
the second being similar. θ¯2 is by definition the largest root of ψ(θ) = μθ + σ
2θ2
2 − (r + λ). It is
immediate that μ > (r + λ)L implies that ψ
(
1
L
)
> 0 and thus that θ¯2 < 1/L.
The last thing that has to be checked is that the threshold x¯0 is lower than L. Given
Equation (A.7), this is equivalent to show that
ln(1− Lθ¯1)− (1− Lθ¯1) ≤ ln(1− Lθ¯2)− (1− Lθ¯2).
Now, the assumption on L implies that θ¯1 < 0 < θ¯2 ≤ 1L . We conclude by remarking that the
function
F (x) = ln(1− Lx)− (1− Lx)
is increasing on (−∞, 1L). 
Coming back to the proof of main Proposition, we first check that the solution V¯ to the
free boundary problem (21) satisfies the variational inequalities (2) and thus dominates the
shareholder value function. By construction, the function V¯ satisfies maxi D(i)V¯ (x) ≤ 0 and
V¯ ′ ≥ 1. We just have to check that V¯ (x) ≥ MV¯ (x) for x ≥ 0 since by construction V¯ (x) =
max(0,MV¯ (0)) for x < 0. Because V¯ ′ ≥ 1,
V¯ (x) = V¯ (0) +
∫ x
0
V¯ ′(y) dy
≥ V¯ (0) + x
= MV¯ (x).
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.
According to Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995), there is a unique pair (V˜0, x˜0) solution to the
following boundary problem:{
σ2
2 V˜
′′
0 + μV˜
′
0 − (r + λ)V˜0 = 0 for x ≤ x˜0
V˜0(0) = 0 , V˜
′
0 (x˜0) = 1 and V˜
′′
0 (x˜0) = 0
The function V˜0 and the threshold x˜0 are explicit and given by
V˜0(x) =
{
eθ˜2x−eθ˜1x
θ˜2eθ˜2x˜0−θ˜1eθ˜1x˜0
for x ≤ x˜0
x− x˜0 + μr+λ for x > x˜0,
(A.9)
where
x˜0 =
1
θ˜2 − θ˜1
ln
θ˜21
θ˜22
. (A.10)
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The only thing we have to check is that D(1)V˜0(x) ≤ 0 for every x > 0. First, for x ≥ x˜0,
one has
D(1)V˜0(x) = −(r + λ)(x− x˜0)− λL < 0.
On the other hand, on the interval (0, x˜0), one has
D(1)V˜0(x) = D(1)V˜0(x)−D(0)V˜0(x)
= V˜0(x)− LV˜ ′0(x).
Finally, note that the function D(1)V˜0(x) is increasing on (0, x˜0) since V˜0 is concave and
D(1)V˜0(x˜0) = μr+λ − L ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Because f ≤ μr+λ − x˜0 where x˜0 is given by Equation(A.10), we can adapt the proof of
Proposition 3 to show that there is a unique solution (V˜1, x˜1) to the free boundary problem:⎧⎨
⎩
σ2
2 V˜
′′
1 + μV˜
′
1 − (r + λ)V˜1 = 0 for x ≤ x˜1
V˜1(0) = V˜1(x˜1)− x˜1 − f , V˜ ′1 (x˜1) = 1 and V˜
′′
1 (x˜1) = 0
V˜1(x) = max(0, x + V˜1(0)) for x < 0
(A.11)
Proof of Proposition 7:
The idea again consists in building a smooth solution (V, x0, x1) to the following free bound-
ary problem ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
2σ
2V ′′(x) + (μ + r0x)V ′(x)− (r + λ)V (x) = 0 for 0 < x < x0
1
2σ
2V ′′(x) + (μ− λL + r0x)V ′(x)− rV (x) = 0 for x0 < x < x1
V (0) = 0 V ′(x1) = 1, V ′′(x1) = 0.
(A.12)
and applying the verification theorem (Theorem 2 in the appendix).
By standard results, we know that there is a unique solution H of the second order equation
1
2
σ2H ′′(x) + (μ + r0x)H ′(x)− (r + λ)H(x) = 0
that satisfies the initial conditions H(0) = 0 H ′(0) = 1. Our candidate solution V satisfies
V (x) = V ′(0). H(x) for 0 < x < x0, where x0 satisfies V (x0) = LV ′(x0) (since V is assumed to
be smooth) or equivalently H(x0) = LH ′(x0).
Let z = inf{x > 0, , H ′′(x) ≥ 0}. It is easy to see that z is finite and that H is concave on (0, z).
Now, two cases have to be considered.
1. L > μ+r0zr+λ .
In that case, it is easy to see that the function θ(x) = H(x) − LH ′(x) is increasing with
θ(z) = H(z) − LH ′(z) < 0. Therefore θ is negative also on (0, z). the shareholder value
function satisfies
V (x) =
{
H(x)
H′(z) for 0 < x < z
x− z + μ+r0zr+λ for x > z.
The optimal policy is to not buy any insurance and to accumulate cash up to threshold z.
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2. L < μ+r0zr+λ .
In that case, there is some x0 < z such that θ(x0) = 0. Now, for x > x0, the shareholder
value function V satisfies
V (x) = V (0)H ′(x0) (LK0(x− x0) + K1(x− x0)) ,
where K0 and K1 are the fundamental solutions of the second order ODE:
1
2
σ2K ′′(x) + (μ + r0x− λL)K ′(x)− rV (x) = 0,
i.e. the solutions that satisfy the initial conditions: K0(0) = 1,K ′0(0) = 0,K1(0) = 0 and
K ′1(0) = 1. It is easy to see that the function ϕ(y) = LK0(y)+K1(y) admits an inflection
point z1, in 0, z. Thus ϕ′′ < 0 on (0, z1) while ϕ′′ > 0 on (z1, z).Setting x1 = x0 + z1, we
get the optimal solution as
V (x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
H(x)
H′(x0)ϕ(z1) for 0 < x < x0
ϕ(x−x0)
ϕ(z1)
for x0 < x < x1
x− x1 + μ+r0x1r+λ for x > x1.
In that case, the optimal policy is to insure whenever x ≥ x0 and to accumulate cash up to
x1.
Proof of Proposition 8: Let H0 and H1 be the solutions of the ordinary differential equation
A(1, 0)H(x) = 0 with initial conditions
H0(0) = 1, H ′0(0) = 0, H1(0) = 0, H
′
1(0) = 1.
The condition Vˆ (0) = 0 implies that Vˆ (x) = Vˆ ′(0)H1(x) for x ≤ x0 where x0 satisfies
H ′′1 (x0) + πhH
′(x0) = 0.
Under the assumption πh ≤ 2μσ2+σ2R , the function θ(x) = H
′′
1 (x)+πhH
′(x) vanishes at some point
xˆ0 lower than the inflection point of H1.
Let K0 and K1 be the solutions of the ordinary differential equation A(0, 0)f(xˆ0 + y) = 0 with
initial conditions
K0(0) = 1, K ′0(0) = 0, K1(0) = 0, K
′
1(0) = 1.
For x ≥ x0, we have
Vˆ (x) = Vˆ ′(0)H ′1(xˆ0)(γK0(x− xˆ0) + K1(x− xˆ0)),
with γ = μ+r0xˆ0−
πh
2
(σ2+σ2R)
r+λ . By the same argument as in Section 4.2, it is straightforward to
prove that the function
ϕ(y) = γK0(y) + K1(y)
admits an inflection point z. Set xˆ1 = xˆ0 + z to conclude.
Proof of Proposition 9: As usual, we have to check that the solution Vˆ of the Proposition
8 satisfies the verification theorem. By construction, we have Vˆ ′(x) ≥ 1 for every x > 0 and
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A(h, 0)Vˆ (x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ xˆ1.
Now, for x ≥ xˆ1, we have
A(h, 0)Vˆ (x) = λVˆ (x− L)− hσ
2
R
2
πh − λ(x− x1)− (r − r0)(x− xˆ1)
≤ λ(Vˆ (xˆ1) + x− L− xˆ1)− hσ
2
R
2
πh − λ(x− xˆ1)− (r − r0)(x− xˆ1)
= λ
(
μ + r0xˆ1
r + λ
− L
)
− hσ
2
R
2
πh − (r − r0)(x− xˆ1)
≤ 0,
since L ≥ μ+r0xˆ1r+λ .
It remains to show that A(h, 1)Vˆ (x) ≤ 0 for every x > 0 and every h. For x ≥ xˆ1, we directly
have
A(h, 1)Vˆ (x) = λ
(
μ + r0xˆ1
r + λ
− L
)
− hσ
2
R
2
πh − (r − r0)(x− xˆ1) ≤ 0,
while for x < xˆ1,
A(h, 1)Vˆ (x) = (A(h, 1)Vˆ (x)−A(h, 0)Vˆ (x)) + A(h, 0)Vˆ (x)
≤ A(h, 1)Vˆ (x)−A(h, 0)Vˆ (x)
≤ λ(Vˆ (x)− LVˆ ′(x)).
But, the function Vˆ (x) − LVˆ ′(x) is clearly increasing on (0, xˆ1) and negative at xˆ1. This ends
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10: The cost of financial frictions is given by:
x∗(μ, σ2) =
1
θ2 − θ1 ln
θ21
θ22
=
σ2
2
√
μ2 + 2rσ2
ln
[√
μ2 + 2rσ2 + μ√
μ2 + 2rσ2 − μ
]
.
x∗ is a continuous, positive function of μ satisfying
lim
{μ→0}
x∗(μ, σ2) = lim
{μ→∞}
x∗(μ, σ2) = 0.
A straightforward but tedious computation gives
∂x∗
∂μ
(μ, σ2) = σ2(μ + 2rσ2)−
3
2
[
−μArgtanh
(
μ√
μ2 + 2rσ2
)
+
√
μ2 + 2rσ2
]
,
where Argtanh is the inverse function of the hyperbolic tangent function.
Thus ∂x
∗
∂μ has the sign of
g(μ) = −μArgtanh
(
μ√
μ2 + 2rσ2
)
+
√
μ2 + 2rσ2.
But, g
′
(μ) = −Argtanh
(
μ√
μ2+2rσ2
)
< 0, while g(0) =
√
2rσ2 and lim{μ→∞} g(μ) = −∞.
Therefore, g changes sign exactly once and x∗ is uniquely defined.
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Moreover, setting t = μ
σ2
and a = 2rμ , we get
x∗(μ, σ2) ≡ f(t) = 1√
t2 + a
Argtanh
(√
t
t + a
)
.
We have f
′
(0) = −1 and f ′′(t) = −2Argtanh
(√
t
t+a
)
. Therefore,
∂x∗
∂σ2
=
∂t
∂σ2
f
′
(t) ≥ 0.
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